High Equality, Low Activity: The Contribution of the Social Welfare System to the Stability of the German Collective Bargaining Regime by Wolfgang Streeck
 
RSCAS 2001/6 © 2001 Wolfgang Streeck 
 




High Equality, Low Activity: The Contribution of the Social 









RSC No. 2001/06 
 
 























EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE  
RSCAS 2001/6 © 2001 Wolfgang Streeck 
All rights reserved. 
No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form  





























© 2001 Wolfgang Streeck  
Printed in Italy in April 2001 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50016 San Domenico (FI) 
Italy  
RSCAS 2001/6 © 2001 Wolfgang Streeck 
In their recent book on Worldwide Changes in Employment Systems, Harry Katz 
and Owen Darbishire (2000) conclude that the main trend on which national 
employment systems are today converging is a n  increase in internal diversity 
accompanied by rising inequality. Like many of us, the authors feel more than a 
little uncomfortable with this. The national industrial relations systems of the 
postwar period were cherished precisely for their capacity to  guarantee all 
workers a common floor of rights and conditions shielded from the pressures 
and vagaries of the market. In this way, they not only protected social peace but 
also helped generate a distribution of life chances less dispersed and more 
egalitarian than what unmitigated market forces would have produced. The big 
question for the future, the book makes clear, is whether we can invent 
institutions and policies for the emerging new employment systems that will be 
capable of performing the equalizing functions that were once so successfully 
performed by classical industrial relations. 
 
As Katz and Darbishire argue, growing diversity and inequality within 
national employment systems make for declining differences between them, and 
thus for a trend towards international convergence. Still, differences persist not 
least with regard to the level of inequality that national systems are disposed to 
admit. Katz and Darbishire report, correctly, that wage dispersion in Germany 
not only has been traditionally low (p. 219), but also remained unchanged in the 
1980s when it increased just about everywhere else, and risen only slightly even 
in the 1990s (pp. 220f.). In their concluding remarks on the German case, Katz 
and Darbishire celebrate the stability of German industrial relation institutions, 
including the remarkable resilience of unions and collective bargaining in he 
face of pressures for “deregulation”, on the assumption that such stability and 
resilience account for the relatively slow increase in inequality in Germany. 
This, in turn, is seen as in keeping with the promises of labor-inclusive postwar 
industrial relations, and therefore as normatively desirable.  
 
My comment, I am afraid, will pour more than a little vinegar into the 
wine of Katz and Darbishire’s surprisingly sanguine analysis of the German 
case. I will not contest that the still comparatively low German wage spread has 
to do with German institutions of industrial relations and their high stability. Nor 
will I argue, as many do, that a narrow wage spread has necessarily become 
incompatible with high employment and is therefore no longer a desirable policy 
goal. In fact, Dutch inequality has risen only slightly in a period when 
unemployment has fallen and employment risen dramatically, and Denmark 
manages to be a highly egalitarian society and a full employment one at the 
same time. What I will say, however, drawing on the German example, is that 
there are ways of defending equality in employment that come at a high price 
both economically and socially, and indeed may perversely generate new and 
severe inequalities that are not immediately visible in the usual employment  
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statistics. High observed equality, in other words, may not always be as good a 
thing as it may seem; in fact it may hide deep inequalities that make the political 
and economic arrangements sustaining it in the longer run unsustainable, not just 
politically and economically, but also morally. To see why this might be so, and 
why I think it  is so in the Germany of today, one needs to do what Katz and 
Darbishire neglect to do: look, not just at industrial relations, but also at social 
welfare systems and, most importantly, the interaction between the two. 
 
In brief, what the German case illustrates is that one way by which a 
labor-inclusive industrial relations system may defend high equality  – and 
incidentally, in so doing, contribute to high overall productivity  – is by 
depressing the rate of economic activity, or more precisely; of statistically 
observable formal, primary sector activity. More specifically, an industrial 
country that manages to have no growth or only little growth in service sector 
employment will have a lower wage spread, as well as higher a ggregate 
productivity. The same happens if employment in the industrial sector is allowed 
to decline. Since this will eliminate the less productive jobs and workers, it will 
result in higher average productivity and, ceteris paribus, higher equality among 
those allowed to remain in the workforce. All it takes to stifle service sector 
expansion and weed out less productive manufacturing is a safely 
institutionalized egalitarian wage setting system, underpinned by a supportive 
social security system that provides for a high reservation wage, with strong 
unions and effective cross-sectoral c oordination, operating in competitive 
international markets and governed by a state without a “Keynesian capacity” 
and facing tight budget constraints. Of course, to avoid political discontent, 
ways must be found to take care of the casualties: those expelled from 
employment and those prevented from entering it. As I will point out below, this 
is indeed at the core of the politics of what may be called a high-equality, low-
activity employment regime. 
 
Germany, I maintain, is one of the foremost examples of such a regime, 
and the size and importance of the country may justify looking at it in more 
detail. Low wage dispersion, as Katz and Darbishire point out, reflects an 
impressive continuity of a system of sectoral wage bargaining with very high 
coverage and strong intersectoral linkage. But it also goes together with a low 
overall rate of labor force participation, at 71.2 per cent in 1999, compared to 
73.6 in the Netherlands (!), 76.3 in the UK, 77.2 in the U.S., and 80.6 in 
Denmark. Moreover, participation effectively declined in the 1990s, a decade 
during which it increased in the Netherlands by no less than seven percentage 
points
1. Low participation  – or, which is the same, high exclusiveness of the 
                                                                 
1 The West German participation rate in 1990 was 69.1 per cent. German unification raised the 
rate of participation by no more than 2 percentage points, although participation in the former  
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German employment system  – is accompanied by high and stable 
unemployment, especially long-term unemployment which in 1998 accounted 
for more than half of the registered unemployed (OECD Employment Outlook 
1999), making for an overall rate of  inactivity of 35.5 per cent in 1999
2. 
Remarkably the rate of inactivity in Germany increased during most of the 
1990s, while the OECD average improved by more than three percentage points 
between 1994 and 1999 (OECD Economic Outlook, Statistical Compendium 
1/200)
3. But as we shall see, this is not the only pathology of the German high-
equality, low-activity employment system, and maybe not even the most 
crippling one. 
 
Before I continue I would like to make clear that German unemployment 
(or more importantly, low activity) is not due to low competitiveness of the 
German economy, and certainly not of its internationally exposed manufacturing 
sector. In 1999, Germany achieved its highest trade surplus ever. While 
industrial employment in manufacturing is shrinking, as it is everywhere, it is 
doing so comparatively slowly, and overall it remains higher than in most other 
industrialized countries
4. Large German firms, from DaimlerChrysler to 
Siemens, are highly prosperous and will continue to be so, however international 
competition may develop. The crisis of German capitalism, if there is one, is not 
a crisis of the German industrial sector. 
 
This is not to say that industry was not in some way part of the problem. 
Due precisely to the historical success of the German manufacturing sector, its 
organizations continue to set the terms of employment and social security for the 
German economy as a whole. IG Metall, the metalworkers’ union, is only 
slowly relinquishing its role as wage leader and pattern setter. Its yearly wage 
claims are traditionally based on the increase in  national average productivity, 
allegedly out of “solidarity” with unions and workers in other sectors, but 
certainly also to legitimate its claim for hegemony within the union movement, 
as well as to unify its own, heterogeneous membership behind a generally 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
DDR had been at a Scandinavian level (OECD Labor Force Statistics, 1998; OECD 
Employment Outlook, 2000). 
2 The rate of inactivity is the percentage of the working age population that is not gainfully 
employed, for whatever reason. It includes the unemployed. 
3 Between 1985 and 1999, the German inactivity rate declined by 2.5 percentage points. In the 
same period, it fell by 12 percentage points in the Netherlands, by 5 in the UK, and by 7 in the 
US. In 1999, inactivity rates in Denmark, the U.S., Japan, Norway and Switzerland were at 
least 10 percentage points lower than in Germany. 
4 At the end of t he 1990s German employment in manufacturing (ISIC 3) accounted for 14.5 
per cent of the population of working age, compared to 11.3 in France, 11.8 in the U.S., and 
13.2 in the UK (OECD Labour Force Statistics).  
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acceptable pay formula
5. Of course, if the service sector were to grow 
significantly, the gap between the productivity increase in the nation at large and 
that in the metal sector would widen, and IG Metall would have to become a 
sectoral u nion among others, rather than a general union in disguise. As long, 
however, as service sector unions are pressured by their members and middle-
level officials to follow the lead of IG Metall and settle near the metal 
agreement, thus keeping the intersectoral wage spread narrow, this is unlikely to 
happen as national pattern bargaining has made the “cost disease” (Baumol 
1967) of the service sector a chronic condition of the German economy. 
 
Moreover, while German manufacturing still provides a comparatively 
large number of jobs, one reason for its high productivity and its resulting high 
competitiveness is slowly declining employment. Firms and sectors may increase 
their productivity, not just by improving their technology or the training of their 
workforce, but also by shedding labor. For German industrial employers, this 
became the method of choice especially in the restructuring period of the mid-
1990s
6. Why labor-shedding on a grand scale was possible despite strong 
employment protection law and well-entrenched unions can be understood only 
if one takes into account the operation of the social security system. Generous 
unemployment benefits and ample opportunities for older workers to move 
directly from unemployment into early retirement allowed unions and works 
councils to tolerate extensive downsizing and enabled employers to externalize 
to the public the costs of social peace in a period of deep restructuring. 
Ironically, the productivity increases brought about through  cooperative 
downsizing were in subsequent wage rounds invoked by the union as 
justification for high wage claims. With the public picking up the bill, 
egalitarian wage bargaining thus happily proceeded, for a declining workforce 




                                                                 
5 Given the high internal diversity of the m etal sector, wage demands based on metal sector 
productivity rises might appear excessive to members in smaller and less productive firms. 
They would also make compromise with the employers association more difficult. 
6 For example, in 1994 nominal wages rose by 3.4 per cent while unit labor costs increased only 
by 0.5 per cent. As the Sachverstaendigenrat (the Council of Economic Advisers) has pointed 
out, part of the productivity increase that made this possible was caused by labor shedding. 
This situation continued at least until 1997. Between 1993 and 1998 industrial employment 
fell from 14 million to 12.3 million, by roughly 12 per cent (OECD Labour Force Statistics, 
1999). 
7 In the service sector, correspondingly, union leaders continued to be able to  follow more or 
less the lead of IG Metall, as less productive employment that might have forced them to 
moderate wage demands or accept lower settlements was never allowed to emerge in the first 
place.  
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The institutional configuration that made this possible had slowly evolved 
during the 1980s. The demise of the Keynesian illusion, which had been more 
short-lived in Germany than in other countries, had sent the government 
searching for a lternatives to fiscal or monetary expansion, to deal with the 
negative employment effects of a wage setting system designed to generate high 
wages and low wage dispersion at the same time. Faced with a strong union 
movement, and therefore prevented from adopting Thatcherist recipes, the Kohl 
government soon discovered the old age pension system as an instrument to 
balance the labor market, this time by reducing supply rather than by increasing 
demand.
8 IG Metall, perhaps remembering its fight in the 1970s f or 
“humanization of work”  – a program that included not just employment 
protection for older workers but also an organization of work geared to their 
special needs and abilities  – originally pressed for a general cut in working 
hours (which, as it was to c ome with full maintenance of pay, in the end 
amounted to just another productivity drive bound to create even more surplus 
labor). However, to avoid defeat in the long strike of 1984 for the 35-hour-week, 
the union had to accept far-reaching “flexibility”  provisions, with respect to 
working time and work organization. As a result it effectively lost control over 
the wage-effort-bargain at the workplace. In subsequent years, employers found 
themselves able to compensate for high wage settlements by raising productivity 
almost at will  – which as a side-effect made them less prepared to drive a hard 
wage bargain and risk a strike. And unions, in the metal industry and elsewhere, 
learned that to continue to be successful in solidaristic-egalitarian high-wage 
bargaining, they only had to accept a subsequent thinning-out of the workforce – 
which they could do without encountering much resistance by their members as 
long as they, together with employers interested in social peace, made sure that 
the government kept  open the easy road to early retirement. The “productivity 
coalition” that used to be the hallmark of the German “social system of 
production” in the 1970s (Streeck 1992) thus assumed a wholly new meaning.  
 
The story of how the German welfare state was enlisted to support high-
wage, high-equality collective bargaining by de-activating growing segments of 
the workforce is long and complex and cannot be recounted here (see Manow 
and Seils 2000). The event that both solidified and radicalized the emerging 
pattern of the 1980s, and for a long time safely entrenched it, was  German 
unification. In the name of equality, but also to protect themselves from low-
                                                                 
8 In fact, not only the pension system. An institution that, with time, became almost as 
important was „active labor market policy“, funded from unemployment insurance 
contributions and originally conceived to provide training and other assistance to help the 
unemployed quickly to move back into employment. I n the 1980s and, even more so, the 
1990s, this turned into a much-used device to maintain people outside gainful employment 
without having to pay them unemployment benefit or social assistance. Participants in active 
labor market policy programs do not statistically count as unemployed.  
  RSCAS 2001/6 © 2001 Wolfgang Streeck  6
wage competition, West German unions and employers associations agreed 
immediately after unity to transfer  the entire West German system of industrial 
relations to the East, including, after a short transition period, West German 
wages. The inevitable result was very high unemployment, which has continued 
ever since. But because the West German welfare state  –  pensions, 
unemployment insurance, labor market policy and all  – had also been extended 
wholesale to East Germany, those whose jobs had been sacrificed on the altar of 
equality could be paid high unemployment benefit, placed on early pensions, or 
absorbed i nto “active labor market policy” programs of all sorts. When during 
the 1990s Eastern wages climbed up to Western levels, as agreed between 
unions and employers associations, the social insurance system became the 
vehicle of a gigantic West-East wealth transfer. Since its main source of revenue 
are social security contributions, the bulk of the costs of unification were borne 
basically by – West German – workers and employers, sparing the government 
the need to raise i ncome or corporate taxes. For the “social partners”, rising 
payroll taxes and non-wage labor costs apparently seemed a price worth paying 
for either wage equality or the elimination of low-wage competition or both  – 
i.e., for the survival beyond unification of West German social partnership and 
high-wage, high-equality collective bargaining. 
 
Even today, unions continue to press for wage equalization in the East, 
notwithstanding 17 per cent unemployment, a further ten per cent of the 
working-age population in “active” labor market policy programs, and average 
productivity only about 60 per cent as high as in West Germany 
(Sachverstaendigenrat 1999, 87). As a r esult, East Germany has become 
structurally dependent on what may originally have been conceived as a set of 
provisional stopgaps for a temporary emergency. Unemployment benefit, social 
assistance and publicly paid training programs for jobs that never m aterialize 
have for an entire decade now been the primary source of income for entire 
families and local communities. Many counties and city governments in the East 
could not perform some of their most elementary functions without the 
temporary employment programs run by the Labor Office for the long-term 
unemployed, which are mostly funded out of payroll taxes. In large parts of East 
Germany,  the Labor Office has b ecome by far the largest “employer”. Any 
attempt to cut expenditure on what is still called “active labor market policy” – 
although it serves mainly to maintain people outside the labor market  – is 
vigorously opposed by the governments of the five Eastern Länder whose local 
economies would collapse without West German compensation for the failure of 
their high-wage, high-equality labor markets to generate a decent level of 
employment
9. Economically, politically and electorally, the “East German 
                                                                 
9 The importance of „labor market policy” for East Germany has become a general excuse for 
its inefficiencies, and in particular its failure to attain what is supposedly its principal 
objective: moving people back into employment as soon as possible. Unification has made it  
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question” – the need to take care of East Germans excluded both from and by 
the West German employment system – has become practically intractable and 
almost a taboo subject in elite political discourse.  
 
Generally, German politics and society h ave been quite inventive in 
disposing of what, under the German employment regime, is a huge mass of 
surplus labor. The bad news is, however, that most of the techniques that were 
developed in the 1980s and 1990s are now meeting their limits. For a long time, 
an important storage facility for surplus labor in Germany has been the 
household. But although the economic participation rate of women, at 55.8 per 
cent, is still comparatively low, being about 15 percentage points below the U.S. 
or Scandinavia (OECD Employment Outlook 1999), generational change is 
inexorably increasing the female labor supply, and keeping women out of the 
labor market is becoming politically more risky
10. Similarly, throughout the 
1990s the universities, attendance of which is free, were a favorite holding pen 
for young people who might otherwise have looked for employment. As a result 
the number of students doubled in twenty years, and so did the student-professor 
ratio as the state had no money to spare. By the end of the century, German 
students were on average 28.8 years old when receiving their first (!) degree. 
There are many obvious reasons why this cannot continue, and indeed pressure 
is building to shorten the time spent in education, not least by introducing 
student fees. 
 
More visible, but certainly not less expensive, was the contribution to 
labor supply management of the social security system. Early retirement has 
reduced the activity rate among those between 55 and 64 years of age to 39 per 
cent in 1998, compared to Switzerland and the U.S. were 71 and 58 per cent, 
respectively, are still in e mployment (OECD Employment Outlook 1998; 
2000)
11. “Active labor market policy”, which in 1999 absorbed about 770,000 
people who would otherwise have added to the number of unemployed, cost 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
possible officially to attribute to labor market policy the additional function of „preserving 
social peace“, in the East but by extension also in the West. This makes any meaningful 
evaluation of its performance impossible. 
10 But note that while due to unification, the female participation rate increased between 1990 
and 1991 by 3.7 percentage points, to 56.9 per cent, it has continuously declined since! 
11 Pension statistics are notoriously difficult to read. But the extent to which the pension system 
was used to take labor out of the market is reflected in the fact that between 1990 and 1998, 
the percentage of new pensioners that retired regularly, at the supposedly normal age of 65, 
fell from 34.7 to 22.8 per cent. During the same period, the percentage of those who were 
allowed to retire at age 60, after a prolonged spell of unemployment, rose from 7.8 to 17.4 per 
cent, with a peak of 22.7 per cent in 1995 (data from  Verband der 
Rentenversicherungstraeger).  
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about 45 billion DM, equivalent to 1.2 per cent of GDP
12. And unemployment 
benefit may run for up to 32 months now, followed if necessary by 
unemployment assistance, which can be paid indefinitely, or by direct transition 
into one of several forms of early retirement
13. Most of this is funded by 
unemployment insurance contributions, which increased from 3 per cent of 
payroll in 1980 to 4.3 per cent in 1990 and 6.5 per cent in 2000, in a period 
during which the general tax burden declined. Since social security contributions 
directly translate into labor costs, defensive labor supply management German-
style has the ability to make its underlying assumption of a shrinking “lump of 
labor” come true: retiring redundant labor at a high level of public subsistence 
funded by payroll taxes drives up the price of the labor of those still in the 
market, thereby making it necessary to retire even more of them. While it is true 
that rising labor costs in Germany in the 1990s were more due to increases in 
social security charges than to wage increases, it is also true that higher social 
security charges were needed to provide compensation for the social exclusion 
caused by, and necessary to sustain, an outdated wage setting system that, in 
alliance with a contribution-based social security system, does not allow for 
employment growth in cost-sensitive segments of the service sector. 
 
While reducing non-wage labor costs is listed among the objectives of the 
1998 “Alliance for Jobs”, it is not really high on anybody’s agenda, the 
catastrophic employment effect of high payroll taxes notwithstanding. For the 
unions, protecting the present pension level, and perhaps even expanding the 
opportunities for their members to retire early, clearly takes precedence, also 
because the vast majority of their members are now either pensioners or over 50 
years old
14. Although employers obviously do not like high labor costs, the large 
                                                                 
12 Paid by the federal unemployment insurance system. An additional DM 10 billion are 
estimated to come from various Länder programs and the European Social Fund.  The 
foremost expert on German labor market policy, Guenther Schmid, considers its funding 
structure “a jungle” (personal communication). At the federal level alone, labor market policy 
pays for special job creation programs that in 1980 covered 0.10 per cent of the working age 
population, 0.22 per cent in 1989, 0.84 per cent in 1992, and 0,69 per cent in 1998. Adding 
the training measures also organized under active labor market policy, the percentage of the 
workforce funded by the system rose from 0.7 in 1980 to 1.4 in 1989; peaking at 3.5 per cent 
in 1992, it stood at 1.8 per cent in 1998 (own calculation based on data from the Federal 
Ministry of L abor). The Red-Green government is pledged to  increase spending on l abor 
market policy, but now finds itself facing severe fiscal constraints. 
13 „Passive“ labor market measures, including expenditures for early retirement, cost another 
DM 90 billion per year. That they do not bear their name for nothing is shown by a recent 
OECD study which found that in Germany only about 2 per cent of those receiving 
unemployment insurance benefits have their benefits suspended for refusing to take a job or 
participate in a training program. In the UK the respective figure is 11 per cent, in Norway, 
12, in the U.S., 26, and in Switzerland, 38 (OECD Employment Outlook, 2000). 
14 Of the 8.623 million members of unions a ffiliated to the DGB in 1997, no more than 
494,000, or 5.7 per cent, were 25 years and younger; in 1985 that figure was still at about 15  
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firms have learned to live with them, and more urgently than cost cutting they 
need the c ooperation of their  works councils and workforces in industrial 
restructuring. F inally, for a government bent on balancing its budget, lower 
social security contributions would make it even more difficult than it already is 
to cut the subsidies it is paying to the social security system out of general tax 
revenues
15. In addition and above all, the deal of the early 1990s still sticks: the 
government makes the welfare state available for absorbing the costs of the 
equality-protecting transfer of West German industrial relations  to East 
Germany, while the “social partners” do not object to the bill being paid by the 
parafiscal social security funds, enabling the government to avoid raising 
general taxes and evade political responsibility for the costs of unification.  
 
The negative employment effects of high non-wage labor costs are 
especially strong at the lower end of the labor market. Note that low 
employment in this category translates simultaneously into equality  in 
employment and exclusion of, mostly unskilled, workers from employment. To 
earn take-home pay of DM 1,600, which given the level of social assistance is 
about the minimum one must earn for work to be attractive, German job seekers 
must find an employer willing to put up DM 2,400 for them, income tax not 
considered. This amounts to an effective “employment tax” of 50 per cent (800 
out of 1,600) or 33 per cent (800 out of 2,400), which to make things worse is 
degressive as it bites much more into lower incomes. The result is that job 
seekers who cannot produce the equivalent of DM 2,400 are eliminated from the 
labor market, even though they might be able to earn a wage of, say, DM 2,000 
which, if they were allowed to keep it, would provide them with an income 
comfortably above the social assistance level
16.  
 
Not surprisingly, then, low activity in Germany is mostly low  unskilled 
activity. Unions, if they address this issue at all, defend the present system by 
arguing that unlike the U.S., low-wage employment is morally unacceptable in 
Germany, and rather than force people to work for low wages, society must 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
per cent. Also, 18.9 per cent of union members in 1999 were pensioners, compared to 13.9 
per cent in 1992. 
15 Indeed, the so-called eco-tax that was introduced by the Red-Green government to finance a 
reduction in social security contributions, in the hope that this would increase employment, 
must now be used to limit the anticipated increase in contributions – which clearly adds to the 
difficulties of the government in defending the tax to a public frustrated with rising e nergy 
prices. 
16 Figures are low estimates. In 1997, 34 per cent of the total labor costs for a single worker 
earning an average wage had to be contributed, by the worker or by the employer, to the 
various social security funds, a level that is exceeded only in France, Italy, Belgium, Austria 
and the Netherlands. The corresponding figure for Denmark is 10 per cent, for the U.S. and 
Japan, 14, for the UK, 17, and for Switzerland, 20 (OECD, Tax/Benefit Position of 
Employees, 1997).  
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provide them with training and other assistance to get them a “good” job. 
Accordingly, German discussions about the need to expand service sector 
employment center on multimedia and software writing, and on labor market 
and training policy to move the unskilled into the new high-skill and high-wage 
employment. Short of this, the present labor market regime protects workers 
from low-wage employment by eliminating them from gainful employment 
altogether and placing them on an social wage even lower than a low wage – in 
return for which they are not expected to do anything other than suffer quietly 
the inevitable deterioration of their employability.  
 
None of this, to be sure, has actually prevented the growth of a significant 
low wage sector in Germany; it has only made it less visible. There is now in 
Germany a growing underground economy, which is estimated to account for no 
less than 15 per cent of GDP. By no means all black labor is low-paid, but a 
good deal is. And while some of the underground workers have social 
protection, others do not, among them one presumes a majority of the lower-
paid. Furthermore, there is in Germany the unique institution of “negligible” or 
“minor” employment (geringfügige Beschäftigung), which is employment below 
the threshold where social security contributions are due. At present this is at 
DM 630 a month, for no more than 15 hours’ work per week. Recent estimates 
suggest that by late 1999, the number of people working holding jobs of this 
sort, often more than one, had grown to about 5.9 million, with an overall 
volume of work performed under the 630 Mark regime equivalent to one million 
full-time and two million part-time jobs (Apel et al., 1999). 630 Mark workers 
are, among other things, not covered by unemployment insurance, and they do 
not accumulate pension entitlements. While millions of unemployed are waiting 
to enter the labor market, a large share of the work in the favorably taxed system 
of geringfügige Beschäftigung – which is largely located in the service sector – 
is being performed by people who can afford its conditions: pensioners on early 
retirement or safely employed workers in the primary sector seeking additional 
tax-free income, competing with immigrants or young people who cannot afford 
not to take 630 Mark jobs as they are not (yet) entitled to benefits
17. With the 
growth of the black economy and the 630 Mark sector, sometimes overlapping 
on their edges, and behind the veil of official employment statistics that 
document  a successful defense of social equality, the 1990s in Germany have 
witnessed the step-by-step evolution of a picture-book dual labor market in 
which a flexible secondary sector compensates for the rigidities of a well-
protected primary sector, with a growing mass of casual workers and immigrants 
for whom primary employment and retirement is an exotic world they will 
almost certainly never be able to enter.  
                                                                 
17 About 1.2 million of those holding 630 Mark jobs in 1999 also had jobs in the primary 
employment sector (Apel et al., 1999).  
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In the meantime, what used to be industrial conflict over wage and 
employment has largely migrated o ut of the unshakably stable institutions of 
industrial relations to the social policy arena. Here it has become deeply 
politicized and assumed new forms and acquired new contents. Depending on 
the public pension system to underwrite the continuation of collective-
bargaining-as-usual, a very high priority for unions today is to defend the 
principle that public pensions should be high enough to preserve a person’s 
standard of living; were they not, retirement ahead of time would be much less 
acceptable for union members. The present battle over pension reform is 
therefore fought with no less fervor by IG Metall than was the 2000 wage round. 
Technicalities aside, existing pension levels can be maintained only if either 
contributions or the effective age of r etirement or both are raised  – for 
demographic reasons, but also because the Finance Minister, under pressure to 
consolidate the budget and cut corporate and income taxes at the same time, is 
determined to reduce government subsidies to the social security system
18. 
Given the present composition of their membership, unions are not necessarily 
opposed to higher contributions – which will, after all, be paid mostly by non-
members; indeed they urgently need them, not simply to keep pensions high but 
also for further labor market relief (“Pension at 60” – Rente mit 60 – was the 
slogan of IG Metall in the last wage round) and still more “active” labor market 
policy programs.  
 
Even if additional revenue could somehow be generated, however, it can 
be spent only once, and in view of the ongoing erosion of the fiscal base of the 
social security system – due to low employment, relocation of economic activity 
to the underground, the expansion of the 630 Mark system, and generally an 
increase in nonstandard employment
19 – consolidation of the pension fund and 
still earlier retirement  pretty much exclude each other. This is why IG Metall 
could not win the battle for  Rente mit 60. But it did not lose it either. The 
impending social security reform will gradually lower pensions  – mostly new 
ones –while simultaneously raising contributions. But in response to both union 
pressure and electoral concerns, pensions will be reduced less than originally 
planned. Contributions, in turn, in order not to antagonize the e mployers and, 
perhaps, the actively employed, and also to contain the resulting increase in non-
                                                                 
18 According to the Federal Ministry of Labor (various Materialbaende for the Sozialbericht), in 
1999 these amounted to 24.1 per cent of total expenditures of the pension fund, up from 19.3 
per cent in 1991, and 20.3 per cent in 1995. Government subsidies to the unemployment 
insurance fund contributed 32.4 per cent to its expenditure in 1998, up from 22.9 in 1989, and 
down from 34.2 per cent in 1993. 
19 Between 1989 and 1996 the number of self-employed without employees increased by 63 per 
cent; during the same period, the share of standard employment  (Normalarbeitsverhältnisse) 
in total employment declined from 75 to 66 per cent.  
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wage labor costs with its negative employment effects, will rise less than the 
unions would have been prepared to tolerate. But in agreeing to raise them at all, 
and in ruling out raising the effective age of retirement instead, the government 
has abandoned one of its most important original objectives, which was to lower 
non-wage labor costs in order to increase employment. Still, while contributions 
will grow in deference to union demands, they will not grow enough to protect 
the government from being punished by the voters for the decline of the pension 
level  – which is why the reform will also introduce a funded obligatory system 
of supplementary pension insurance. While this will increase the share of their 
income workers are to put aside for their social security, it will not increase non-
wage labor costs as contributions are to be paid by employees only. When IG 
Metall demanded that just as in the public system, one half of the contributions 
be paid by employers, the government as a compromise agreed to subsidize the 
retirement savings of low-income earners out of general taxes. 
 
What about equality, then? Ask the Turkish immigrant family earning 
their living on a combination o f 630 Mark jobs, with no prospect of a wage 
increase ever and without almost any social insurance protection; or a young 
person facing far higher social security contributions than his or her parents, for 
what will be a substantially lower pension; or a 48-year-old long-term 
unemployed with no hope to get back into employment; or a woman confined to 
the “silent reserve”, with no affirmative action plan or equal employment 
opportunity office anywhere near; or one of the growing number of those in 
“atypical employment”; or an East German being rotated from an “active” labor 
market training program into a one-year public employment program, and from 
there to unemployment benefit and the next training program. For them, equality 
among a shrinking core workforce, with their permanent 36-hour-jobs, six 
weeks of paid vacation and a full pension at, on average, age 58 is likely to 
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